Special Divine Acts: Three Pseudo-Problems and a Blind Alley by Larmer, Robert
EUROPEAN JOURNAL FOR PHILOSOPHY OF RELIGION 7/4 (WINTER 2015), PP. 61-81
SPECIAL DIVINE ACTS: 
THREE PSEUDO-PROBLEMS AND A BLIND ALLEY
ROBERT LARMER
University of New Brunswick
Abstract. Traditionally, special divine acts have been understood as involving 
intervention in the course of nature, so as to cause events that nature would not, 
or could not, otherwise produce. The concept of divine intervention has come 
under heavy fire in recent times, however. This has caused many philosophers 
and theologians either to abandon the possibility of special divine acts or to 
attempt to show how such acts need not be understood as interventions in natural 
processes. This paper argues that three objections typically raised against special 
divine acts conceived as interventions in the natural order are pseudo-problems 
and pose no reason to abandon the traditional conception of such acts. Further, 
it argues that attempted noninterventionist accounts constitute a blind alley of 
investigation, inasmuch as they fail to provide a secure foundation for a robust 
account of the possibility of special divine acts.
INTRODUCTION
Traditionally, special divine acts have been understood as involving 
intervention in the course of nature, so as to cause events that nature 
would not, or could not, otherwise produce. The concept of divine 
intervention has come under heavy fire in recent times, however. This 
has caused many philosophers and theologians either to abandon the 
possibility of special divine acts1 or attempt to show how such acts need 
not be conceived as interventions in natural processes.2 This paper 
1 Maurice Wiles, for example, was prepared to abandon the category of special divine 
acts writing that ‘the primary usage for the idea of divine action should be in relation to 
the world as a whole rather than to particular occurrences within it’. Maurice Wiles, God’s 
Action in the World (London: SCM, 1986), p. 28.
2 Robert J. Russell, perhaps the foremost proponent of NIODA (non-interventionist 
objective divine action), argues that “because of developments in the natural sciences, 
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argues that three objections typically raised against special divine acts 
conceived as interventions in the natural order are pseudo-problems 
and pose no reason to abandon the traditional conception of such acts. 
Further, it argues that purported noninterventionist accounts are a blind 
alley inasmuch as they fail to provide a secure foundation for a robust 
account of the possibility of special divine acts.
I. FIRST PSEUDO-PROBLEM
A frequent objection to mind-body dualism is that it is inconceivable 
that there can be any causal relation between material and immaterial 
substances. We find, for example, Richard Taylor insisting ‘that as soon 
as the smallest attempt at any description is made [of how an immaterial 
mind could act on a physical body] the description becomes unintelligible 
and the conception an impossible one’.3 It thus comes as no surprise that 
Arthur Peacocke, critical of the idea that mind-body dualism might 
provide resources for conceiving God’s relation to the world, writes that,
it is [...] difficult to imagine how God might be an agent in [the] world 
[... if] the only analogy for such agency has itself been formulated in 
dualistic terms that involve a gap dividing action in the ‘body’, and so 
in the natural world, from intentions and other acts of the ‘mind’. This 
is an  ontological gap between two kinds of entities across which it is 
difficult to see how in principle a bridge could be constructed.4
In much the same vein, David Corner claims that ‘if the supernatural 
entities that are supposed to have causal efficacy in the natural world 
including quantum physics, genetics, evolution, and the mind/brain problem, and 
because of changes in philosophy, including the move from epistemic reductionism to 
epistemic holism and the recognized legitimacy of including whole-part and top-down 
analysis, we can now view special providence as consisting in the objective acts of God in 
nature and history [...] and we can interpret these acts in a non-interventionist manner 
consistent with the natural sciences”.
Robert J. Russell, Cosmology: From Alpha to Omega (Minneapolis: Fortress Press, 
2008), pp. 111-112.
3 Richard Taylor, Metaphysics, 2nd ed. (New Jersey: Prentice-Hall, 1974), p. 25. 
In a  similar vein, Jaegwon Kim writes, ‘just try to imagine how something that isn’t 
anywhere in physical space can alter in the slightest degree the trajectory of even a single 
material particle in motion.’ Jaegwon Kim, Philosophy of Mind (Boulder, Colorado: 
Westview Press, 1998), p. 4.
4 Arthur Peacocke, Theology for a Scientific Age (Oxford: Blackwell, 1998), p. 148.
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are conceived as being too different from natural entities, it will be hard 
to say how there can be any causal interaction between nature and the 
supernatural’.5
Much can be said by way of reply to this objection, but in the context 
of a short paper it suffices to make two points. First, the suggestion that 
we cannot imagine how it is possible for an immaterial entity to causally 
affect the material world ignores the fact that all basic causal relations 
are, in the final analysis, conceptually opaque.6 Even in cases of causation 
in the physical world, we have at the most fundamental level no account 
of how one thing causes another. Brian Ellis is correct to remind us that,
sooner or later, in the process of ontological reduction, we must come 
to events and processes that are not themselves structures of constituent 
causal processes. These most elementary causal processes [...] will 
consist entirely of elementary events [...] the identities of the basic causal 
interaction that initiate and terminate elementary causal processes [...] 
cannot depend in turn on their causal structures.7
We may, for example, become familiar with the fact that masses attract 
one another. We may even give the name of gravity to the fact that they 
do so, and describe gravity as one of the fundamental processes of nature. 
To the degree that it is fundamental, however, there can be no account 
of how it is the case that masses can attract each other, no specification 
of a mechanism by which this happens, only the observation that they in 
fact do so.8 Given, then, that all causal relations are in the final analysis 
conceptually opaque, there is no more difficulty in thinking such relations 
can exist between immaterial and material entities than in thinking they 
can exist between material entities.9 In both cases, as William Hasker 
5 David Corner, The Philosophy of Miracles (London: Continuum, 2007), p. 42.
6 For a  fuller discussion see Robert Larmer, The Legitimacy of Miracle (Lanham, 
Maryland: Lexington Press, 2014), pp. 105-108, 155-159.
7 Brian Ellis, Scientific Essentialism (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001), 
p. 51.
8 An  anonymous critic has suggested that despite conceptual opacity we rightly 
recognize constraints on causation and that one of the constraints is that ‘like-can-only-
cause-like’. Such a constraint, however, cannot be simply assumed without begging the 
question against the dualist. For the difficulties in justifying such a claim see John Foster, 
The Immaterial Self (London: Routledge, 1991), pp. 159-163.
9 To claim that direct divine causal intervention is causally opaque is not to claim 
that what are recognized as special divine acts, say the Virgin Birth, can have no natural 
processes associated with them. As C. S. Lewis notes, “If God annihilates or creates or 
deflects a unit of matter He has created a new situation at that point. Immediately all 
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observes, ‘we have no ultimate insight into the causal relations involved, 
except to say, “That’s the way things are.’”10
Second, the objection appears to prove too much. If successful, it 
demonstrates not only that the idea of divine intervention is incoherent, 
but that the idea of a creator God is incoherent, since if an immaterial 
God cannot stand in a causal relation to a material world He can scarcely 
be viewed as its creator and sustainer. Such an  objection, therefore, 
requires that one be prepared to argue that the existence of the material 
world logically implies that even if God exists He cannot be thought to 
have created the world, that is to say, the doctrine of creation ex nihilo 
is logically incoherent. Arguments in support of such an  ambitious 
and counter-intuitive claim are not in evidence, and it would be 
an understatement to suggest that it is difficult to think how they could 
be formulated. I  conclude, therefore, that objections to special divine 
acts conceived as divine interventions in nature based on the purported 
difficulty of holding there cannot be causal relations between immaterial 
and material entities pose a pseudo-problem.
II. SECOND PSEUDO-PROBLEM
A  second objection that is routinely raised against special divine 
acts understood as interventions in the course of nature is that such 
interventions would violate the Principle of the Conservation of Energy. 
William Stoeger speaks for many when he writes that
direct divine intervention [...] would involve an immaterial agent acting 
on or within a material context as a cause [...] This is not possible [...] if 
Nature domiciles this new situation, makes it at home in her realm, adapts all other events 
to it. It finds itself conforming to all the laws. If God creates a miraculous spermatozoon 
in the body of a  virgin, it does not proceed to break any laws. The laws at once take 
it over. Nature is ready. Pregnancy follows, according to all the natural laws, and nine 
months later a child is born. [...] If events ever come from beyond Nature [...] she will 
[... not] be incommoded by them. [... She will] hasten to accommodate the newcomer. 
The moment they enter her realm they obey all her laws. Miraculous wine will intoxicate, 
miraculous conception will lead to pregnancy [...] miraculous bread will be digested. The 
divine art of miracle is not an art of suspending the pattern to which events conform 
but of feeding new events into that pattern.” C. S. Lewis, Miracles (First published 1947. 
Reissued London: Fontana, 1974), pp. 63-64.
10 William Hasker, The Emergent Self (Ithaca, New York: Cornell University Press, 
1999), p. 150.
65SPECIAL DIVINE ACTS
it were [...] energy [...] would be added to a system spontaneously and 
mysteriously, contravening the conservation of energy.11
Such an  objection, however, ignores a  crucial ambiguity in how the 
Principle is formulated. It is typically stated as either ‘Energy can 
neither be created nor destroyed’,12 or as ‘In an isolated system the total 
amount of energy remains constant’, the assumption being that these 
two statements are logically equivalent. This assumption is false. If one 
claims that ‘Energy can neither be created nor destroyed’ then one must 
also claim that ‘In an isolated system the total amount of energy remains 
constant’. To claim, however, that ‘In an isolated system the total amount 
of energy remains constant’13 does not commit one to the claim that 
‘Energy can neither be created nor destroyed’. The latter claim involves 
a much greater metaphysical commitment than the former.
It is important that these two formulations of the Principle not be 
conflated. Theists cannot accept the claim that energy can neither be 
created nor destroyed, since it not only rules out divine intervention but 
creation ex nihilo. If the universe is conceived to be composed of forms 
of energy that can neither be created nor destroyed, then one pays the 
compliment of necessary existence to energy rather than to God, and 
there is no sense in which God can be conceived as being the cause of the 
existence of the physical order.14
11 William Stoeger, ‘Describing God’s Action in the World in Light of Scientific 
Knowledge of Reality’, in Chaos and Complexity: Scientific Perspectives on Divine Action, 
edited by Robert John Russell, Nancey Murphy, and Arthur Peacocke. (Jointly published 
by the Vatican Observatory Foundation and The Center for Theology and the Natural 
Sciences, 1995), pp. 239-61 (p. 244). Also, Willem Drees, ‘Gaps for God’, in Chaos and 
Complexity: Scientific Perspectives on Divine Action, edited by Robert John Russell, 
Nancey Murphy, and Arthur Peacocke. (Jointly published by the Vatican Observatory 
Foundation and The Center for Theology and the Natural Sciences, 1995), pp.  225-
227. Unsurprisingly, similar objections are frequently made concerning the possibility 
of mind-body interaction. See, for example, Daniel Dennett, Consiousness Explained 
(Boston: Little, Brown & Co., 1991), p. 35.
12 Sheldon Glashow, From Alchemy to Quarks (U.S.A.: ITP, 1994), p. 104.
13 Kenneth Krane, Modern Physics, 2nd ed. (U.S.A.: Wiley, 1996), p. 4.
14 Nicholas Saunders fails to appreciate this point when he dismisses the importance 
of distinguishing between the two forms of the Principle, arguing that ‘it is [...] not 
reasonable to make retrospective claims concerning the limitation of divine freedom 
in creating the world out of nothing on the basis of a  set of laws which have only 
evolved due to its establishment’. Nicholas Saunders, Divine Action and Modern Science 
(Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2003), p. 74. It is one thing to claim that God 
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Theists, however, need have no difficulty accepting the claim that 
energy is conserved in an isolated system. Accepting this claim commits 
them not to rejecting that there is good evidence that energy is conserved 
to the degree that a  system is causally isolated, but rather to rejecting 
the speculative claim that the physical universe is an isolated system not 
open to the causal influence of God. In short, theists are in a position to 
affirm the Principle when it is formulated as a scientific law and not as 
a metaphysical commitment which excludes the possibility of creation 
ex nihilo.15
What this means is that, so long as there is good reason to accept the 
scientific rather than the metaphysical form of the Principle, there can 
be no basis upon which to generate a balance of probabilities argument 
opposing evidence which supports belief in divine intervention and 
evidence which supports belief in the Principle. The theist denies not 
that energy will be conserved in an isolated system, but that the physical 
universe is in fact an isolated system. Accepting the occurrence of divine 
intervention in nature does not commit the theist to denying the vast 
body of experimental evidence supporting the claim that energy will 
be conserved in an isolated system, but rather to denying the far more 
speculative claim that the universe is isolated in the sense of not being 
open to the causal influence of God. As Alvin Plantinga comments in 
an extravagant but telling example,
it is entirely possible for God to create a full-grown horse in the middle 
of Times Square without violating the principle of the conservation of 
energy. That is because the systems including the horse would not be 
closed or isolated. For that very reason, there would be no violation of 
could create a world that has a different material nature than our own, and consequently 
a different set of laws. It is quite another, however, to claim that God could accomplish 
the logically impossible task of creating something (energy) which can neither be created 
nor destroyed. Contra Saunders, the point is not whether physical laws can be thought 
of as coming into existence with the Big Bang, but whether the claim that energy can 
neither be created nor destroyed is logically inconsistent with the claim of creation ex 
nihilo.
15 Ducasse, writing in 1951, failed to distinguish between the two forms of the 
Principle. He saw clearly, however, the implications of the claim that energy can neither 
be created nor destroyed, when he noted that the Principle of the Conservation of Energy 
‘is something one has to have if, as the materialistic ontology of [...] naturalism demands, 
one is to be able to conceive the physical world as wholly self-contained, independent, 
isolated’. Curt Ducasse, Nature, Mind, and Death (La Salle, Ill.: Open Court Publishing, 
1951), p. 241.
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the principle of conservation of energy, which says only that energy is 
conserved in closed or causally isolated systems – ones not subject to 
any outside influence. It says nothing at all about conservation of energy 
in systems that are not closed; and, of course, if God created a horse ex 
nihilo in Times Square, no system containing that horse, including the 
whole of the material universe, would be closed.16
It bears emphasis that any attempt to move from the well-evidenced claim 
energy is conserved in an isolated system to the claim that the universe 
is in fact an isolated system is ill-founded. All that any experiment can 
be thought to show is that, to the degree that a system is isolated, the 
amount of energy in it is conserved. Such evidence is neutral as regards 
the further question of whether there exists an entity capable of creating 
or destroying energy. If the move from the claim that energy is conserved 
in an isolated system to the claim that energy can neither be created nor 
destroyed were to be justified, it would have to be on the grounds that 
there exists no evidence that energy is ever created or destroyed and that 
the claim that energy can neither be created nor destroyed constitutes 
a deep structural explanation of why energy is conserved in an isolated 
system. Any such attempted justification fails on several counts.
First, the theist is able to provide an  alternative deep structural 
explanation of the fact that energy is conserved to the degree that 
a system is causally isolated. The theistic conception of the universe as 
a contingent reality in which secondary physical causes operate equally 
explains why the scientific form of the Principle holds true. It will not do, 
therefore, for the critic to suggest that the claim that energy can neither 
be created nor destroyed is the only possible deep structural explanation 
of energy conservation in isolated systems.
Second, the claim that energy can neither be created nor destroyed 
is at odds with our best cosmological theory, namely the Big Bang. This 
theory is commonly interpreted as implying an absolute beginning to the 
mass/energy that composes the universe.17 It is possible to accept both 
the claim that energy is conserved in an isolated system and an absolute 
beginning to the universe, but it is hard to see how acceptance of the 
claim that energy can neither be created nor destroyed is consistent with 
16 Alvin Plantinga, Where the Conflict Really Lies (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
2011), p. 79.
17 Robert Spitzer, New Proofs for the Existence of God (Grand Rapids, Michigan: 
Eerdmans, 2010), pp. 13-104.
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Big-Bang cosmology, since it would imply that the mass/energy making 
up the universe had no beginning.
Third, the claim that energy can neither be created nor destroyed, 
cannot be used as the basis upon which to frame a balance of probabilities 
argument designed to show conflict between the positive evidence taken 
to support belief in the Principle and the evidence in favour of special 
divine acts. Acceptance of the claim that energy can neither be created nor 
destroyed requires, at the very least, that there exists no positive evidence 
that energy is ever created or destroyed. The occurrence of special divine 
acts, conceived as events involving the creation or annihilation of energy, 
conflicts not with any positive experimental evidence supporting belief 
that energy is conserved to the degree that a system is isolated, but rather 
with the negative claim that there is no evidence for events involving the 
creation or destruction of energy. Faced with reports of special divine 
acts, the occurrence of which would arguably constitute evidence that 
energy can be created or destroyed, it begs the question to dismiss such 
reports as antecedently improbable on the grounds that they imply the 
falsity of the claim that energy can neither be created nor destroyed. One 
cannot rule out there being mice in the building on the grounds that 
there is presumably no evidence of their presence, and then refuse to 
accept reports of tracks, scat, and sightings on the basis that one has 
already established that there are no mice in the building.18 Similarly, 
one cannot urge that the claim that energy can neither be created nor 
destroyed be accepted on the basis that this has never been observed, 
and then use one’s acceptance of that claim to rule out the occurrence 
of special divine acts, on the grounds that such events would constitute 
evidence that energy can be created or destroyed.
It is evident, therefore, that attempts to move from the well-evidenced 
claim that to the degree that a  physical system is causally isolated its 
energy will be conserved, to the speculative claim that energy can neither 
be created nor destroyed, cannot be justified. The claim that energy can 
neither be created nor destroyed is at odds with our best cosmological 
theories, begs the question of whether special divine acts occur, and 
18 An anonymous critic has objected that the charge of question begging is premature, 
since it might turn out that the people reporting tracks, scat, and sightings are mistaken 
or unreliable. This objection, however, misses the point. It is one thing to assess how 
strong the positive evidence is, quite another to dismiss the possibility of considering 
such positive evidence on the question begging assumption that one has already 
established that it does not exist.
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a priori rules out the possibility of theism being true. It functions not as 
a well-evidenced statement of observed regularity in nature but rather as 
an unfounded defining postulate of physicalism. I conclude, therefore, 
that objections to special divine acts, understood as divine interventions 
in nature, based on the claim that such events would violate the Principle 
of the Conservation of Energy pose a pseudo-problem.
III. A BLIND ALLEY
Concerned to cleave to the mistaken claim that the amount of energy 
must remain constant in the universe on pain of violating the Principle 
of the Conservation of Energy, thinkers such as Nancey Murphy, John 
Polkinghorne, and Arthur Peacocke have attempted to show how special 
divine acts can occur within an  energetically closed universe, not by 
an input of energy but by an input of information, and that such acts need 
not be conceived as interventions. Although such attempts have become 
de rigueur, they appear incapable of delivering what they promise. 
I shall briefly describe these attempts and some very specific problems 
with each of them. I shall then mention a fundamental problem which 
plagues all three and which, quite independently of the various specific 
problems, appears to doom such efforts to failure. The conclusion to be 
drawn is that such attempts fail to secure any kind of foundation for 
a robust defence of the possibility of special divine acts. They constitute, 
therefore, a blind alley which defenders of special divine acts would do 
well to avoid.
Murphy’s Special Divine Acts as Exploiting Quantum Indeterminacy
Nancey Murphy’s account of special divine agency takes quantum 
indeterminacy as providing inherent gaps in the natural order – what 
William Pollard termed ‘loopholes’19 – in which God may be conceived 
as having room to operate. In her view, although subatomic entities 
have inherent powers, God’s action is required if these powers are to be 
actualized.20 Thus every quantum event requires a specific intentional act 
19 William Pollard, Chance and Providence (New York: Scribner, 1958), p. 8.
20 Nancey Murphy, ‘Divine Action in the Natural Order: Buridan’s Ass and 
Schrödinger’s Cat’, in Chaos and Complexity: Scientific Perspectives on Divine Action, 
edited by Robert John Russell, Nancey Murphy, and Arthur Peacocke. (Jointly published 
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of God as its determining cause.21 There is no need, however, to conceive 
of God as competing with natural causes, since at the subatomic level 
natural causes are insufficient to determine all outcomes.22 God’s agency, 
on this model, is the hidden variable which underlies the apparent 
indeterminacy of quantum processes.23
There are a  number of problems which suggest that the approach 
taken by Murphy is unsatisfactory. A major concern is that it is unclear 
how the quantum processes of the microworld relate to events in the 
macroworld. Murphy’s epistemology appears to be one of critical realism, 
yet the standard Copenhagen interpretation of quantum mechanics 
which she adopts, is usually linked to an extreme instrumentalism. As 
Lawrence Osborn notes, on the Copenhagen interpretation,
the probabilities generated by the Schrödinger wave equation do not 
correspond to any physical reality. There simply is no reality to be 
described until an  act of measurement collapses the wave function. 
Quantum mechanics is merely a useful calculating device for predicting 
the possible outcomes of such acts of measurement.24
It is difficult to see how Murphy’s claim that God acts on microphysical 
entities in such a manner that one quantum state rather than another 
is realized, can be made consistent with an  interpretation of quantum 
physics which holds that prior to an act of measurement such entities do 
not exist.
A further concern is that quantum indeterminacies at the microlevel 
‘dampen out’ to deterministic regularities at the macrolevel. In order for 
quantum indeterminacy to make a difference to how events unfold in the 
world there must be some means of amplifying the effect of particular 
quantum indeterminacies.25 This implies, however, that models of divine 
by the Vatican Observatory Foundation and The Center for Theology and the Natural 
Sciences, 1995), pp. 325-57 (p. 344).
21 Ibid., p. 339.
22 Ibid., p. 343.
23 Ibid., p. 342.
24 Lawrence Osborn, ‘Theology and the New Physics’, in God, Humanity and 
the Cosmos, ed. by Christopher Southgate (Harrisburg, Pennsylvania: Trinity Press 
International, 1999), pp. 95-136 (p. 115).
25 Thomas Tracy, ‘Particular Providence and the God of the Gaps’, in Chaos and 
Complexity: Scientific Perspectives on Divine Action, edited by Robert John Russell, 
Nancey Murphy, and Arthur Peacocke. (Jointly published by the Vatican Observatory 
Foundation and The Center for Theology and the Natural Sciences, 1995), pp. 291-324 
(p. 317). Also, Thomas Tracy, ‘From Quantum Physics to Theology’, in Philosophy, Science 
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agency which seek to exploit quantum indeterminacy are radically 
incomplete, unless they can also account for the means by which 
particular quantum effects are amplified.
The most natural candidate, indeed perhaps the only candidate, for 
providing a means of amplifying the effects of quantum events seems to 
be chaotic systems. There are many problems with such a suggestion but 
it suffices to mention two.
First, a major, but frequently ignored, problem for those attempting 
to develop a  model of divine agency based on integrating quantum 
indeterminacy and chaos theory is that quantum theory seems to 
imply that chaos cannot occur. According to quantum theory, systems 
described by the Schrödinger equation are not capable of exhibiting 
the type of sensitive dependency on their initial state characteristic of 
chaotic systems. We have at present no resolution of the problem of how 
to reconcile quantum theory and chaos theory and no solution seems 
apparent on the horizon.26 Given this state of affairs, any suggestion that 
the modus operandi of divine agency in creation is the amplification of 
quantum events by means of chaotic systems seems ill-considered.
Second, even if this difficulty is ignored, nature is not nearly so chaotic 
as is required if chaos theory, combined with quantum indeterminacy, is 
to provide a foundation for a robust account of special divine acts. Jeffrey 
Koperski puts the point well when he writes that
even if we grant that most systems are nonlinear (and therefore possibly 
chaotic), aperiodicity and randomness are dynamical characteristics 
that often reside in the midst of perfectly regular evolutions. Chaos, 
like background noise, is routinely ignored and rightly so. [...] To put 
it crudely, [such an account of special divine action] describes a causal 
pathway in which God could alter the arrangement of bubbles in the 
crest of a tsunami but not redirect its course. Presumably more is wanted 
from an account of divine agency.27
Polkinghorne’s Special Divine Acts as Exploiting Chaotic Systems
Whereas Murphy focuses upon quantum indeterminacy as providing 
a loophole in natural processes by which God might be provided a way 
and Divine Action, edited by F. LeRon Shults, Nancey Murphy, and George Ellis (Boston: 
Brill, 2009), p. 208.
26 Jeffrey Koperski, ‘God, Chaos and the Quantum Dice’, Zygon, 35:3 (2000), 555-556.
27 Ibid., p. 556. Also, Jeffrey Koperski, The Physics of Theism (West Sussex, UK: Wiley 
Blackwell, 2015), p. 177.
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to perform special divine acts, John Polkinghorne appeals to chaotic 
systems as providing such an opportunity. Polkinghorne thinks that it 
is theologically significant that chaotic systems are extremely sensitive 
and thus inherently unpredictable. In his view, the epistemological 
uncertainty inherent in attempting to predict the behaviour of chaotic 
systems, suggests that such systems are ontologically open. Given their 
ontological openness, God may causally influence their behaviour. He 
does so not by an input of energy, but by a ‘top down’ input of information.28 
This suggestion that God achieves particular purposes through the 
instrumentality of chaotic systems does not, however, Polkinghorne 
insists, relegate God to acting in the role of an unpredictable quantum 
event. He writes,
the significance of the sensitivity of chaotic systems to the effect of small 
triggers is diagnostic of their requiring to be treated in holistic terms and 
of their being open to top-down causality through the input of active 
information. It is not proposed that this is the localized mechanism by 
which agency is exercised. [...] that either we or God interact with the 
world by [...] adjustment of infinitesimal details of initial conditions so 
as to bring about a desired result.29
God’s providential particular acts are thus situated within theism’s 
broader doctrine of creation.
Apart from the already noted difficulty that the amount of chaos 
present in nature appears to place unacceptable restraint on what God 
may actually accomplish in terms of special acts by exploiting chaotic 
systems, Polkinghorne’s proposal faces a  major obstacle inasmuch as 
it is far from clear that his move from epistemological indeterminacy 
to ontological indeterminacy can be justified. The equations typically 
used to model chaotic systems are deterministic and physicists generally 
conceive chaotic systems as determined. Thus Wesley Wildman and 
Robert Russell argue that
chaos in nature gives no evidence of any metaphysical openness in nature. 
The fact that a natural dynamical system is open to its environment, which 
28 John Polkinghorne, Belief in God in an Age of Science (New Haven: Yale University 
Press, 1998), pp. 62-63.
29 John Polkinghorne, ‘The Metaphysics of Divine Action’, in Philosophy, Science and 
Divine Action, edited by F. LeRon Shults, Nancey Murphy, and George Ellis (Boston: 
Brill, 2009), p. 106.
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is sometimes described in terms of a  whole/part causal relationship, 
does not entail metaphysical openness, for the entire environment 
may be causally determined [...] Sensitive dependence  – a  feature of 
chaotic dynamical systems in mathematics  – is attributed to natural 
systems on the basis of the power of mathematical dynamical systems 
to model them. To the extent that this modeling works [...] the natural 
presupposition is that the (metaphorical) ‘determinism’ of mathematical 
chaotic dynamical systems corresponds to the metaphysical determinism 
of nature. Put bluntly, [sensitivity to the altering of conditions] testifies to 
the high degree of causal connectedness in certain natural systems and 
so is most naturally exploited in support of the thesis of metaphysical 
determinism.30
Polkinghorne has responded by suggesting that the unwillingness to opt 
for the ontological indeterminacy of chaotic systems ‘stems from the fact 
that a theory of this kind has not yet been formulated in any detail, whilst 
the alternative interpretation of “deterministic chaos” [...] has the time-
honoured equations of classical dynamics as its rigorous articulation’.31 
He goes on to argue that,
it is, however, mathematically possible to enlarge the class of solutions 
that will be admitted, in order to include what are called non-integrable 
solutions. [...] A holistic account is then necessary and at the same time 
a rigid determinism is no longer present.32
His reply, however, has the appearance of special pleading, inasmuch 
as he is unable to appeal to any scientific, as opposed to specifically 
theological reasons, for thinking that chaotic systems are best modelled 
non-deterministically.
Peacocke’s Special Divine Acts as Instances of Top-Down Causality
The late Arthur Peacocke, in commenting on appeals to ‘unpredictability, 
open-endedness and flexibility’ as making possible non-interventionist 
special divine acts, makes the point that the possibility that God works 
30 Wesley Wildman and Robert Russel, ‘Chaos: A Mathematical Introduction with 
Philosophical Reflections’, in Chaos and Complexity: Scientific Perspectives on Divine 
Action, edited by Robert John Russell, Nancey Murphy, Arthur Peacocke. (Jointly 
published by the Vatican Observatory Foundation and The Center for Theology and the 
Natural Sciences, 1995), pp. 49-90 (p. 82).
31 John Polkinghorne, Belief in God in an Age of Science, p. 65.
32 Ibid., pp. 65-66.
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undetectably by influencing quantum events or chaotic systems does not 
escape an interventionist conception of such acts. He writes,
such a conception of God’s action in these, to us, unpredictable situations 
would [...] be no different in principle from the idea of God intervening 
in a  deterministic, rigidly law-controlled, mechanistic order of nature 
[...] the only difference, on this view, would seem to be that, given our 
irreducible incapacity to predict the histories of natural systems, God’s 
intervention (for that is what it would properly have to be called) would 
always be hidden from us.33
Peacocke’s own model of divine agency is grounded in his account of 
what it is to be a  person. Rejecting any dualist account of the mind/
body relation as inherently unscientific, he insists that ‘“mental events” 
in human beings are the internal descriptions we offer of an actual total 
state of the brain itself and are not events in some entity called the “mind” 
which exists in some other non-physical mode that is ontologically 
distinct from matter and “interacts” (mysteriously, one would have to 
say) with the brain as a  physical entity’.34 Appealing to the concept of 
supervenience, he holds that there are various levels of description of 
brain events and processes and that there are no bridge laws by which 
higher levels of description can be reduced to lower levels. Thus we can 
describe a particular event in the brain at a  lower level of description 
as a series of neuron firings and also at a higher level of description as 
a conscious decision to perform an action. This means that ‘the language 
we use concerning the connections between our mental experiences – 
the language of reasons, intentions, and so forth – really does [...] refer 
to actual causal linkages’.35 The threat of reductionism is thus avoided 
without having to posit any gap in the operation of physical causes. 
Analogously, God’s agency within creation can be seen as operating at 
a supervenient level that does not necessitate abandoning the principle 
that the physical realm is energetically closed.36 Although he insists that 
‘God’s action is on the world-as-a-whole’37 he maintains that such action 
‘can be general or particular in its effects’.38 Presumably, then, room can 
33 Arthur Peacocke, Theology for a Scientific Age, pp. 154-155.
34 Ibid., p. 60.
35 Ibid., p. 61
36 Ibid., p. 153.
37 Ibid., p. 163.
38 Ibid., p. To the best of my knowledge, Peacocke simply asserts that this is the case, 
giving no argument for his claim.
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be made for special divine acts. Such acts, however, ‘would never be 
observed by us as a divine “intervention”, that is, as an interference with 
the course of nature and as a setting aside of its observed relationships’.39
Peacocke’s account of the person is a  nonreductive physicalist one 
which countenances the emergence of new causal powers such that top-
down causality is possible. As we have noted, he views God’s relation 
to the world as analogous to his account of the mind-body relation,40 
arguing that we should conceive of God not as separate from the 
universe but as comprising a higher-level supervening upon the natural 
processes of the universe.41 An issue which he never addresses, however, 
is that this line of thinking most naturally suggests that God depends 
upon the world to exist, rather than the world depending upon God to 
exist. Perhaps he would not have been happy with taking the analogy 
in this direction, but it is the direction which his view of the mind-
body relation as analogous to the God-world relation most obviously 
suggests, as is attested by the tendency of those opting for nondualistic, 
noninterventionistic accounts of divine agency to reject classical theism 
and its doctrine of creatio ex nihilo in favour of panentheism.42 Certainly 
we see in Peacocke a preference for the idea of divine emanation rather 
than the idea of divine making,43 and a move from classical theism to 
panentheism.
Of further concern is Peacocke’s overly optimistic espousal of the 
reality of emergent irreducible causal powers, ignoring the fact that 
while supervenience may guarantee semantic irreducibility, it does not 
entail causal autonomy.44 He holds that,
(1) analysis of complex systems reveals the ontological reality of 
higher-level properties which exert genuine irreducible causal 
influence upon lower-level properties, and
(2) higher-level properties are generated by virtue of their realization 
in a particular configuration of lower-level properties.45
39 Ibid.
40 Arthur Peacocke, Creation and the World of Science (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 
1979), pp. 133-139.
41 Arthur Peacocke, Theology for a Scientific Age, p. 159.
42 See, for example, Ian Barbour, Religion and Science: Historical and Contemporary 
Issues (San Francisco: Harper, 1997), pp. 306-12.
43 Arthur Peacocke, Theology for a Scientific Age, pp. 168-169.
44 Dennis Bielfeldt, ‘Can Western Monotheism Avoid Substance Dualism?’, Zygon, 
36:1 (March 2001), 153-77 (p. 170).
45 Arthur Peacocke, Theology for a Scientific Age, pp. 54-55.
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appearing not to have noticed that these two claims are inconsistent. 
The relation of higher-level properties to lower-level properties is one 
of dependency with no new causal powers being created. Top-down 
causation is not, therefore, something that a  nonreductive physicalist 
account of the person can accept. On such theories, the causal powers of 
higher-level properties are wholly dependent upon the causal properties 
of the lower-level properties by which they are realized. This means that 
whatever causes lower-level properties to be instantiated also causes 
higher-level properties to be instantiated; the result being that any given 
instance of higher-level properties will enter into exactly the same causal 
relations that its corresponding instance of lower-level properties enter 
into. As Kim observes,
there are no new causal powers that magically accrue to [upper-level] 
properties over and beyond the causal powers of [lower-level] properties. 
No new causal powers emerge at higher levels, and this goes against the 
claim [...] that higher-level properties are novel causal powers irreducible 
to lower-level properties.46
Peacocke’s appeal to the emergence of genuine irreducible higher-level 
causal powers cannot, therefore, be justified.47
A General Problem for Non-Interventionist Accounts of Special Divine Acts
We have noted various specific problems with the typical strategies of 
attempting to conceptualize special divine acts in a non-interventionist 
way. All are motivated by what I  have argued is a  pseudo-problem, 
namely the concern that divine intervention in nature would violate the 
Principle of the Conservation of Energy. To make room for the possibility 
of special divine acts, they all suggest that God may perform such acts 
not by an input of energy, but rather by an input of information.
This suggestion, however, is vulnerable to the objection that all 
instances of information input into physical systems have energetic 
implications.48 Thus, for example, in the analogy provided by Peacocke 
of a program controlling the electronic changes in a computer, it is clear 
that the writing and storing of the program has energetic implications. 
Also, it is evident that the program will only function in conjunction 
46 Jaegwon Kim, Philosophy of Mind (Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press, 1998), p. 232.
47 Bielfeldt puts the point nicely when he writes that ‘semantic irreducibility does not 
entail causal autonomy’. ‘Can Western Monotheism Avoid Substance Dualism?’, p. 170.
48 Willem Drees, ‘Gaps for God’, p. 226.
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with a computer, that is to say, an intelligently designed artefact which 
itself is a product of the imposition of structure on physical components. 
Further, even if we ignore the fact that the intelligent structuring of the 
program and the computer has energetic implications, it is clear that 
the desired output is produced by the program and computer together 
constituting the initial boundary conditions under which energy flows 
take place. This suggests a  deistic rather than theistic model of God’s 
relation to the world. On Peacocke’s analogy, God must be conceived as 
the master programmer who achieves his purposes through setting the 
initial boundary conditions under which subsequent physical processes 
occur without any further input. Only if we think of the programmer as 
continuing to interact with his program and computer can the analogy 
accommodate a theistic model of God’s relation to creation that includes 
special divine acts. This, however, implies the type of intervention that 
Peacocke refuses to contemplate; the result being that his analogy counts 
against rather than for his account of how non-interventionist special 
divine acts are presumed to be possible.
To his credit, Peacocke does not duck the point that the input of 
information into the physical universe by God would have energetic 
implications. Acknowledging this, he writes
so we still have a problem of the ‘causal joint’, now in the form of: How 
can God exert his influence on, make an input of information into, the 
world-as-a-whole without an input of matter/energy? This seems to me 
to be the ultimate level of the ‘causal joint’ conundrum, for it involves 
the very nature of the divine being in relation to that of matter/energy 
and seems to me to be the right place in which to locate the problem, 
rather than at some lower levels in the created order at which divine 
‘intervention’ would then have to be postulated with all of its difficulties.49
Besides constituting an admission that he has no answer to the problem 
of how information could be added to the universe without any energetic 
implications, this passage highlights that, despite claiming that his 
account could allow for special divine acts, Peacocke’s model of divine 
agency in creation is essentially deistic, presenting no worked out 
account of how it is consistent with the occurrence of special divine acts.
Consideration of these three typical strategies, as exemplified 
by Murphy, Polkinghorne, and Peacocke, suggests that purported 
49 Arthur Peacocke, Theology for a Scientific Age, p. 164.
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non-interventionist accounts of the possibility of special divine acts are 
in fact a  blind alley. In the case of Murphy and Polkinghorne, we are 
offered not a non-interventionist account of special divine action, but 
rather the claim that such intervention will always lie hidden in ‘those, 
to us, uncloseable gaps in the predictability of the natural world’.50 In 
the case of Peacocke, as we have seen, he avoids intervention only at the 
price of offering a deistic account of God’s relation to the world.
IV. THIRD PSEUDO-PROBLEM
A  third pseudo-problem lurking in discussion of the possibility of 
special divine acts is the largely unexamined assumption that there must 
exist some causal indeterminacy in natural processes in which God 
may be thought to have room to operate. Otherwise, the view seems 
to be, special divine acts would either not be possible or would imply 
violating the laws of nature. Thus Pollard, whose seminal Chance and 
Providence has had great influence on the contemporary discussion 
of the possibility of special divine acts, takes causal indeterminacy in 
nature to be a necessary condition of such acts, since otherwise there is 
‘extraordinary difficulty [...] in imagining any kind of loophole through 
which God could influence [events]; [... no] point in the world [...] at 
which the hand of God could be thrust in and providence [...] actually 
exercised’.51 Similarly, Robert Russell takes for granted that if nature does 
not exhibit ontological indeterminism then special divine acts would 
imply violation of the laws of nature.52
But why think this? The question of whether a system is deterministic 
in how it functions must be distinguished from the question of whether 
it is causally closed. It is entirely possible for an  external agent to 
influence what happens in a deterministic system, without violating the 
laws operating in the system. One does not break any of Newton’s laws 
of motion if one tosses an extra billiard ball into the mix, yet one alters 
the outcome of what would otherwise occur on the table. If God changes 
the material conditions to which the laws apply, He thereby produces 
an event that nature would not have produced on its own, but violates no 
laws of nature. Robert Young aptly makes this point when he writes that
50 Ibid., p. 154.
51 William Pollard, Chance and Providence (New York: Scribner, 1958), p. 8.
52 Robert Russell, Cosmology: From Alpha to Omega (Minneapolis, MN: Fortress, 
2008), p. 127.
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God is an active agent-factor in the occurrence of [... special divine acts] 
such that his presence introduces a new (possibly unique) set of causally 
sufficient factors. His presence ceteris paribus alters the outcome from 
what it (perhaps) would have been if, contrary to fact, he had not been 
present. Here there is no sense of violation or physical impossibility, [or] 
mere coincidence.53
It is thus clear that whether the physical universe exhibits causal 
indeterminacy or, as even some interpretations of quantum mechanics 
require, is deterministic in its functioning, God as its Creator, is capable 
of acting upon it. It is true that if God brings about an  event that 
would not otherwise occur there will be an explanatory gap in terms of 
natural causes,54 but such a gap is best understood as the result of God’s 
action, not the prerequisite of it. To insist otherwise undermines any 
robust conception of special divine acts inasmuch as it sets immensely 
restrictive limits on what God can be thought to be able to bring about. 
It is only the insistence by non-interventionists that the physical universe 
be understood as causally closed that requires them to hold that special 
divine action is impossible in the absence of genuine indeterminacy in 
how nature functions, and that such action must be constrained to the 
very narrow limits allowed by such indeterminacy. This insistence is 
far from warranted in light of the fact that no scientific theory requires 
that the universe be conceived as causally closed and that the result of 
such insistence is a view of special divine acts that allows God ‘to alter 
the arrangement of bubbles in the crest of a tsunami but not redirect its 
course’.55
CONCLUSION: TO ACT IS TO INTERVENE
At the beginning of this paper, it was noted that special divine acts have 
traditionally been understood as involving intervention in the course 
53 Robert Young, ‘Miracles and Physical Impossibility’, Sophia, Vol. 11, No. 3 (1972), 
29-35 (p. 33).
54 Tracy, whose position is similar to Murphy’s, nevertheless sees this point clearly, 
writing that ‘if we affirm that God performs particular actions which affect the course 
of events in the world, then it certainly appears that we must also grant that there will 
be gaps in the explanation of these events in the sciences’. Thomas Tracy, ‘Particular 
Providence and the God of the Gaps’, in Chaos and Complexity: Scientific Perspectives on 
Divine Action, p. 323.
55 Jeffrey Koperski, ‘God, Chaos and the Quantum Dice’, p. 557.
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of nature so as to cause events that nature would not, or could not, 
otherwise produce. Indeed, the very meaning of the word ‘act’ seems to 
imply that such acts must be conceived as interventions. To act in the 
midst of an  ongoing historical process is precisely to intervene in the 
sense of producing an event that would not otherwise occur. If I act to 
hang a picture on the wall of my room then I intervene to bring about 
a state of affairs that would not otherwise occur. If Jesus acts to multiply 
loaves and fishes to feed a hungry crowd he intervenes to bring about 
a state of affairs that would not otherwise happen. This being the case, 
it seems a contradiction in terms to speak of ‘noninterventionist special 
divine acts’.56
Polkinghorne is correct when he insists that ‘if the insights of 
a providence at work in human lives and in universal history, are to carry 
the weight of meaning that they do in Christian tradition and experience, 
then they must not simply be pious ways of speaking about a process 
from which particular divine activity is in fact absent and in which the 
divine presence is unexpressed, save for a general letting-be’.57 Christian 
philosophers and theologians need to defend special divine acts. They 
56 Such a conclusion could, perhaps, be avoided if one were to embrace a thoroughgoing 
determinism such that all events are uniquely determined by the initial conditions God 
puts in place at the creation of the physical universe. Suggesting such a possibility comes 
at the considerable cost of ruling out free will and making the problem of evil vastly more 
difficult. There is also the issue of whether such a  suggestion is scientifically credible, 
given the nature of the physical universe; the question being not whether God could 
possibly create a universe in which front-loading could work, but whether it could work 
in this actual universe. Thus Michael Chaberek notes: “The question that faces the concept 
of front-loading, also known as ‘evolution projected by God’ is whether the vision of 
watchmaker creating watches able to form new watches is really better than the vision of 
someone who personally and directly affects his works. One may also wonder whether 
the world as we know it, with its strict laws and physical limitations really allows one to 
create watches which produce other watches, and whether less advanced watches can 
produce greater and more complex watches. In the world we live in, we do not encounter 
watches capable of making other watches at all, just as we do not find engineers trying 
to design self-assembling cars. It is not that engineers choose to design car factors of 
self-assembling cars only because of their inadequate intelligence or lack of skill. Rather 
the constraints of objective reality make them create factories instead of self-assembling 
devices. One can even say that this approach actually testifies to their contrivance and 
comes from a clear distinction between what is possible in our world and what is a mere 
futuristic fantasy.” Michael Chaberek,. O.P. ‘Seeking the Truth about Theistic Evolution, 
Animal Death, and Intelligent Design.’ In More than Myth?, ed. by Paul D. Brown and 
Robert Stackpole (U.S.A.: Chartwell, 2014), pp. 135-157 (p. 154).
57 John Polkinghorne, Belief in God in an Age of Science, p. 49.
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should do so, however, in full recognition that the objections typically 
raised to conceiving special divine acts as interventions in nature 
constitute pseudo-problems, and that proposed noninterventionist 
accounts – quite apart from the fact that they seem a contradiction in 
terms  – have all proven a  blind alley, incapable of providing a  secure 
foundation for a robust conception of special divine acts.
